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Abstract
We propose Februus; a novel idea to neutralize insidous and
highly potent Trojan attacks on Deep Neural Network (DNN) sys-
tems at run-time. In Trojan attacks, an adversary activates a back-
door crafted in a deep neural network model using a secret trigger, a
Trojan, applied to any input to alter the model’s decision to a target
prediction—a target determined by and only known to the attacker.
Februus sanitizes the incoming input by devising an extraction method
to surgically remove the potential trigger artifacts and use an inpaint-
ing method we propose for restoring the input for the classification
task. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the efficacy
of Februus against backdoor attacks, including advance variants and
adaptive attacks, across vision applications. Notably, in contrast to
existing approaches, our approach removes the need for ground-truth
labelled data or anomaly detection methods for Trojan detection or
retraining a model or prior knowledge of an attack. We achieve dra-
matic reductions in the attack success rates; from 100% to 0.25% (in
the worst case) with no loss of performance for benign or trojaned
inputs sanitized by Februus. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first backdoor defense method for operation in black-box setting
capable of sanitizing trojaned inputs without requiring costly labelled
data.
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Figure 1: A Trojan attack illustration from BadNets [12] demonstrating a
backdoored perception model of a self-driving car running a STOP sign that
could cause a catastrophic accident. Left: Normal sign (benign input). Right:
Trojaned sign (trojaned input with the Post-it note trigger) is recognized as
a speed limit of 100 km/h by the trojaned network in the self-driving car.
1 Introduction
We are amidst an era of data driven machine learning (ML) models built upon
deep neural network learning algorithms achieving superhuman performance
in tasks traditionally dominated by human intelligence. Consequently, deep
neural network (DNN) systems are increasingly entrusted to make critical
decisions on our behalf in self-driving cars [6], disease diagnosis [15], facial
recognition [22, 23], malware detection [25] and so on. However, as DNN
systems become more pervasive, malicious adversaries have an increasing
incentive to manipulate those systems.
One Machiavellian attack exploits the model building pipeline of DNN
learning algorithms. Constructing a model requires: i) massive amounts of
training examples with carefully labelled ground truth—often difficult, ex-
pensive or impractical to obtain; ii) significant and expensive computing
resources; and iii) specialized expertise for realizing highly accurate models.
Consequently, practitioners rely on transfer learning to reduce the time and
effort required or Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) [1,5] to build neu-
ral network systems. In transfer learning, practitioners re-utilize pre-trained
models from an open source model zoo such as [2] with potential model vul-
nerabilities; intentional or otherwise. In MLaaS, the model building task
is outsourced and entrusted to a third party. Unfortunately, these model
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building approaches provide malicious adversaries opportunities to manipu-
late the training process; for example, by inserting carefully crafted training
examples to create a backdoor or a Trojan in the model.
Trojan models behave normally for benign (clean) inputs. However, when
the trigger, often a sticker or an object known and determined solely by the
attacker, is placed in a visual scene to be digitized, the trojaned model mis-
behaves [4,8,12,18]; for example, classifying the digitized input to a targeted
class determined by the attacker—as illustrated in Fig. 1. Unfortunately,
with millions of parameters within a DNN model, it is extremely difficult to
decompose or explain the decision made by a neural network [19, 26]. Nor-
mally, the only independent model validation available to practitioners is
the model accuracy for the classificaiton task. Thus, the Trojan can remain
cleverly concealed, until the chosen time and place of an attack determined
solely by the adversary.
A distinguishing feature of a Trojan attack is a secret physical backdoor
activation trigger of shape, size or features self-selected by the adversary—
i.e. independently of the DNN model. The ability to self-select a natural,
surreptitious and/or inconspicuous activation trigger physically realizable in
a scene (for instance a pair of glasses in [8] or a facial tattoo in our work—
see Fig. 4 later) makes Trojan attacks easily deployable in the physical world
without suspicion and highly potent in practice.
Our focus. We recognize the difficulty of proposing a single defence against
the security problems of deep neural networks; problems we are only begin-
ning to understand. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on more mature deep
perception systems where backdoor attacks pose serious security threats to
real-world applications in classification tasks such as traffic sign recognition,
face recognition or scene classification. Consider, for example, a traffic sign
recognition task in a self-driving car being misled by a trojaned model to
misclassify a STOP sign as an increased speed limit sign as described in
Fig. 1.
Our key focus is on input-agnostic triggers—currently, the most dominant
backdoor attack methodology [8,12,18] capable of easily delivering very high
attack success to a malicious adversary. Here, a single trigger is created by an
attacker to apply to any input to activate the backdoor to achieve a prediction
to the targeted class selected by the adversary. We also consider physical
and realistic examples of Trojans and placements in a scene. Additionally,
we investigate adaptive attacks against our defense and advanced backdoor
variants such as larger triggers and multiple triggers investigated in the IEEE
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S&P 2019 study [24].
In particular, we deal with the problem of allowing time-bound systems to
act in the presence of potentially trojaned inputs where Torjan detection and
discarding an input is often not an option. For instance, the autonomous car
in Fig. 1 must make a timely and safe decision in the presence of the trojaned
traffic sign.
Defence is challenging. Backdoor attacks are stealthy and challenging
to detect. The ML model will only exhibit abnormal behaviour if the secret
trigger design appears while functioning correctly in all other cases. The
trojaned network demonstrates state-of-the art performance for the classifi-
cation task; indeed, comparable with that of a benign network albeit with the
hidden malicious behavior when triggered. The trigger is a secret guarded
and known only by the attacker. Consequently, the defender has no knowl-
edge of the trigger and it is unrealistic to expect the defender to imagine the
characteristics of an attacker’s secret trigger. The unbounded capacity of the
attacker to craft triggers implies the problem of detection is akin to looking
for a needle in a hay stack.
Notably, in recognizing the challenges and the severe consequences posed
by Trojan attacks, the U.S. Army Research Office (ARO) and the Intel-
ligence Advanced Research Projects Activity organization recently solicited
techniques for defending against Trojans in Artificial Intelligence systems [3].
In contrast to existing investigations on Trojan detection [7,9,10,13,24] and
cleaning [7, 13, 17, 24] a network, we seek to investigate the following ques-
tions:
Can we apply classic notions of input sanitization to visual
inputs of a deep neural network system?
Can deep perception models operate on sanitized inputs without
sacrificing performance?
1.1 Our Contributions and Results
This paper presents the results of our efforts to investigate sanitizing any
visual inputs to DNNs and to construct and demonstrate Februus1 a plug-
and-play defensive system architecture for the task. Februus sanitizes the
inputs to a degree that neutralizes the Trojan effect to allow the network
1We considered the Roman god Februus—the god of purification and the underworld—
as an apt name to describe our defense system architecture.
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to correctly identify the sanitized inputs. Most significantly, Februus is able
to retain the accuracy of the clean inputs; identical to that realized from a
benign network. We summarize our contributions as below:
1. We investigate a new defense concept—unsupervised input sanitization
for deep neural networks—and propose a system architecture to real-
izing it. Our proposed architecture, Februss, aims to sanitize inputs
by: i) exploiting the trojan introduced biases leaked in the network to
localize and surgically remove triggers in inputs; and ii) restore inputs
using image inpainting to achieve highly accurate model performance,
even in the presence of trojaned inputs.
2. Our Februus, in particular, is tailored for time-bound systems requiring
a decision even in the presence of trojaned inputs; here, detection of a
Trojan and discarding an input is often not an option.
3. Februus is plug-and-play compatible with pre-existing DNN systems
in deployments, operates at run-time and in a black-box setting; i.e
without the knowledge of the network or Trojan information.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the
classical notions of input sanitization as a defence mechanism against Trojan
attacks on DNN systems and propose a generalizable and robust defense
based on the concept. Our extensive experiments provide clear answers to
our research questions: i) we can apply notions of input sanitization in an
unsupervised setting to the visual inputs of a deep neural network system;
and ii) deep perception models, without requiring any adjustments, are able
to achieve state-of-the art performance in the presence of our proposed input
sanitization system; Februus—we describe in Section 4.
2 Background: Backdoor Neural Networks
Firstly, we will begin with some background knowledge on Deep Neural Net-
works which is mostly used in our work.
Taking an input x ∈ RN , a Deep Neural Network is a parameterized
function FΘ : RN → RM that map x to y ∈ RM in which Θ are the function’s
parameters. Input x could be an image, and output y in the case of image
classification is the probability vector over m classes.
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DNN is structured with L hidden layers inside, and each layer i ∈ [1, L]
has Ni neurons. Outputs of those neurons are called activations denoted as
ai ∈ RNi , and formulated as follows
ai = φ(ωiai−1 + bi) ∀i ∈ [1, L] (1)
where φ is a non-linear function, ωi are weights at that layer, ωi ∈ RNi−1×
RNi , and bi are fixed bias bi ∈ RNi
Weights and biases belong to network parameters Θ while other param-
eters such as the number of hidden layer L, number of neurons in each layer
Ni or non-linear activation function φ are called hyper-parameters.
The output of the network is the last layer’s activation function y =
σ(ωL+1aL + bL+1) where σ : RM → RM normally is the softmax function.
σ(z)j =
ezj∑M
m=1 e
zm
(2)
for j = 1, ...,M and z = (z1, ..., zM) ∈ RM
One special type of DNN is Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [11]
which is widely used in computer vision and pattern recognition task. In
CNN network, besides fully connected layers, it contains convolutional layers
which are in 3D volumes, and each activation of a neuron in CNN layer is
determined by a subset of neurons in the previous layers computed by a 3D
matrix of weights known as a filter. There will be the same filter for each
channel, and Ni filters will be needed for Ni channels at i convolutional layer.
To train a DNN network, we need to determine the hyper-parameters
(such as the architecture type, number of L hidden layers) as well as network
parameters (weights and biases). Taking image classification as an example,
we need to have a training dataset of image inputs knowing the ground-
truth labels. Noting the training dataset as Dtrain = {xti, yti}Ni=1 of N inputs,
xti ∈ RN , and ground-truth labels yti ∈ [1,M ]. The training process is trying
to determine the distances between the predictions of inputs and the ground-
truth labels, these distances are measured by a loss function L. The learning
algorithm will return Θ∗ such that
Θ∗ = argmin
Θ
N∑
i=1
L(FΘ(xti, yti)) (3)
To verify the network, a separated validation set of V inputs with their
ground-truth labels Dvalidation = {xvi , yvi }Vi=1 will be used. In most cases, this
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is the only requirement that most Deep Learning practitioners care of, and
it would lead to security threats of backdoor attacks which will be discussed
in Section 2.1.
2.1 Backdoor Attacks
DL training requires a huge amount of labeled data to get an acceptable error.
However, there are only a few people who can have access to those costly
labeled data, while the demand for AI applications and DL is enormous.
Transfer learning is one of the commonly popular methods applied in this
case when users have a limitation of labeled data. However, using transfer
learning on a pre-trained model could bring a great number of security threats
that users might not aware of. In recent works, authors [12, 18] have shown
that backdoor attacks can be applied in transfer learning leading to the
security threats for those who are relying on transfer learning.
Not only big data, but huge computational power consumption is also a
challenge for users to train a DNN. Therefore, one solution arises recently
which is Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) where users outsource their
specifications of their DNN to a third-party service. Normally, the only
measurement in their specification is the accuracy of the model. As shown in
backdoor papers [8,12,18], the backdoor attack methods can achieve identical
or even better accuracy than the clean network which satisfied the specifi-
cation of the user, while embedding malicious trojan that can be activated
when the pattern trigger is presented.
3 Threat Model and Terminology
In our paper, we consider an adversary who wants to manipulate the DL
model to misclassify any inputs into a targeted class when the backdoor
trigger is presented, while keeping the normal behavior with all other kinds
of inputs. This backdoor can help attackers to impersonate someone with
higher privileges in face recognition system or can mislead the self-driving
car to a specific target identified by attackers. Identical to the approach of
recent papers [9, 10, 24], we focus on input-agnostic attacks while the trig-
ger will misclassify any inputs to a targeted class regardless input sources
(illustrated in Figure 2). We also assume that attacking is pretty strong
with white-box access and have full control of the training process to gener-
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ate a strong backdoor, which is relevant to the current situation of popular
pre-trained models and MLaaS. Besides, the trigger types, shapes, and sizes
would also be chosen arbitrarily by attackers. The adversary holds the full
power to train the poisoned model from MLaaS or publishing their poisoned
pre-trained models online. Particularly, the adversary will poison a given
dataset Dtrain by inserting a portion of poisoned inputs yielding the poisoned
model θP 6= θ (benign model). This poisoned model will behave normally in
most case but will be misled to the targeted class chosen by attackers when
the trojan trigger appears. Formally, ∀xi, ti ∈ Dval, FθP (xi) = Fθ(xi) = ti,
but FθP (xiadv) = ttarget where misclassify adversarial input xiadv generated
from a function fadv: xiadv = fadv(xi).
In other words, the model will perform normally for benign inputs xi,
while mistarget to the target ttarget when the malicious inputs with trigger
on it xiadv present (illustrated in Figure 2).
Trojaned DNN
A. Fine Frenzy
A. Fine Frenzy
A. A. GillA. A. Gill
Abby Elliott
Ravel Morrison
Trojaned inputs
Benign input
...
... ...
...
Figure 2: Input-agnostic backdoor attack. The backdoor trigger is a country flag
sticker. Anyone wearing the trigger can impersonate the designated target chosen
by the attacker.
On the defending side, similar to other papers [9,10,24], we assume that
defenders have a held-out clean dataset that they can use to implement their
defense methods. Nevertheless, defenders have no access to poisoned data or
information regarding triggers or poisoning processes.
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4 Overview of Our Approach Against Back-
door
This section will explain the overview of our system to detect and clean out
trojans. We will use an example of Traffic Sign Recognition task to illustrate
for our system (Figure 3). The trigger is a flower (used in [12]) located at the
center of the Stop sign. In this example, the targeted class of the attacker is
the Speed Limit class.
Visual 
Explanation
Mask 
Generation
Image 
Inpainting
DeepCleanse FrameworkTrojaned 
input
Trojaned
DNN
Predicted: 
speed limit
Ground-truth: 
Stop
predict: 
Stop
Figure 3: Overview of Februus framework. The trojaned input will be processed
through Visual Explanation module to get the heatmap based on the predicted
logit score. Then, the heatmap will be converted to a mask through the Mask
Generation process before applying unsupervised Image Inpainting method to re-
construct the occluded region to enhance the classification performance.
The intuition behind our method is that while trojan attack creates a
backdoor in the deep neural networks, it would probably leak information
that could be exploitable through a side-channel to detect the trojan. By
interpreting the network decision, we found the leak information of trojan
effect through the decision of DNN in feature maps by using the Visual
Explanation tool such as GradCAM [20]. However, detecting the trojan is not
sufficient in some critical applications such as self-driving cars when denying
the service is not an option. We contribute to the discipline by adopting the
GAN-based inpainting method from computer vision [14] to turn the trojaned
images into benign ones which restores the trojan’s network performance and
still correctly classifies the trojaned images. Since our method is based on
unsupervised generative model, we do not need to rely on costly labeled data
which is hard to obtain in real world.
The overall idea of Februus is illustrated in Figure 3. First of all, the
input will be processed through Visual Explanation module to identify the
important regions regarding the logit score of the predicted class. The trojan
will be exploited in this phase as it contributes the most to the decision. As
the trojan attack is input-agnostic, it means that the trojan can misclassify
all inputs to the targeted class regardless of what the source class of the
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input is. Under the exploitation of the DNN interpretability, this effect will
be exposed (as shown in Figure 3). After detecting the trojan area, Februus
will remove it out of the picture frame during Mask Generation process to
eliminate the trojan effect. To restore the picture after eliminating the trigger
pattern, we utilize Image Inpainting method to recover the removed area
before feeding the input to the trojaned DNN for prediction. By applying
our Februus framework, it will not only eliminate the trojan but also maintain
the performance of the trojaned DNN by correctly classifying the trojaned
inputs as well as benign inputs . Distinct from previous works, our Februus
framework can work in a black-box manner regardless of whether the network
and inputs are trojaned or not, and can be used as a trojan filter attached to
any DNNs to defense against backdoor attacks without reconfiguration the
network or costly labeled data.
5 Experiment Evaluation of Backdoor Input
Sanitization
We evaluate our method on different real-world classification tasks which
are CIFAR10 [16] for Scene Classification and GTSRB [21] for Traffic Sign
Recognition.
• Scene Classification (CIFAR10). This task is widely used in computer
vision. Its goal is to recognize 10 different objects in tiny colored images
[16]. The dataset contains 50K training images and 10K testing images.
• Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSRB). This German Traffic Sign Benchmark
(GTSRB) dataset is commonly used to evaluate the vulnerabilities of
DNN as it is related to autonomous driving and safety concerns. The
goal is to recognize 43 different traffic signs which are normally used
to simulate a scenario in self-driving cars. The dataset contains 39.2K
colored training images and 12.6K colored testing images [21].
Attack Configuration Our attack method is following the methodology
proposed by Gu et al. [12] to inject backdoor during training. Here we
focus on the powerful input-agnostic attack scenario where the backdoor was
created to allow any inputs from any source labels to be misclassified as the
targeted label. For each of the task, we choose a random target label and
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poison the training process by injecting a proportion of adversarial inputs
which were labeled as the target label into the training set. Through our
experiments, we see that only a proportion of 10% of the adversarial inputs
could achieve the high attack success rate of 100% while still maintaining the
high accuracy performance (Table 1).
Table 1: Attack Success Rate and Classification Accuracy of Backdoor Attack
on Different Classification Tasks.
Task
Infected Model Clean Model
Classification
Accuracy
Attack Success
Rate
Classification
Accuracy
Scene Classification
(CIFAR10)
90.53% 100% 90.34%
Traffic Sign
Recognition (GTSRB)
96.77% 100% 96.60%
The triggers used for our experiment evaluation are illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. All of the triggers are physical ones that can be deployed in real-world
scenarios, here we also implement the triggers in previous works [12] such as
flower trigger for CIFAR10 and Post-it note for GTSRB.
6 Mitigation of Backdoors
After successfully deploying the backdoor attacks on different networks, we
build the Februus framework which can automatically detect and eliminate
the trojans while keeping the performance of the neural network with high
accuracy. The performance of the trojaned networks after attached with
our Februus framework is identical with the benign model, while the attack
success rate from backdoor trigger reduces significantly from 100% to roundly
0%. Details regarding the results are discussed below:
6.1 Scene Classification (CIFAR10)
For Cifar10, the flower trigger (shown in Figure 4) is used. The trigger is of
size 8 × 8, while the size of the input is 32 × 32. As shown in Table 2, the
accuracy of the poisoned network is 90.53% which is identical to the clean
model 90.34% (poisoned successfully). When the trigger is presented, 100%
11
Figure 4: Physical triggers (1st row) and their real-world deployment used in our
experiment evaluation (2nd row).
From left to right: the flower and Post-it note trigger (used in [12]) deployed in
CIFAR10 and GTSRB tasks respectively
inputs will be mislabeled to the targeted ”horse” class, causing the attack
success rate to 100%. However, plugging in our Februus method, the attack
success rate is significantly reduced to 0.25 %, while the performance on clean
inputs is 90.08% identical to the clean network. This means that we success-
fully cleanse out the trojans when they are presented while maintaining the
performance of DNN through our Februus method. The illustration is shown
in Figure 5.
12
Figure 5: Backdoor Detection and Elimination via Image Inpainting on CIFAR10
and GTSRB.
6.2 Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSRB)
We got a similar result on GTSRB. While the attack success rate of the
trigger (post-it note shown in Figure 4) is 100%, after our Februus system,
the attack success rate drops significantly to 0%, showing the robustness of
our method across platforms. The accuracy for cleaned input after Februus
is 96.48% which is identical to the clean model of 96.60% as shown in Table 1.
Table 2: Februus Results for Different Classification Tasks
Task
Before Februus
(infected model)
After Februus
Classification
Accuracy
Attack Success
Rate
Classification
Accuracy
Attack Success
Rate
CIFAR10 90.53% 100.00% 90.08% 0.25%
GTSRB 96.77% 100.00% 96.48% 0.00%
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7 Robustness Against Clean Inputs
One distinctive feature that differentiates Februus from other methods is that
our method can work regardless of the input is poisoned or not. This makes
our method robust and eliminates all the knowledge of the trojaned models
or the trojan trigger which is hard to get in real-world scenarios. We can
think of Februus as a filter to cleanse trojans out of inputs before feeding
into DNNs.
Table 3: Februus Robustness Against Clean Inputs on Different Classification
Tasks. The classification accuracy is identical among poisoned and clean
inputs in different visual tasks, which makes Februus robust and does not
need the pre-knowledge of the poisoned networks or inputs.
Task
Poisoned Inputs Clean Inputs
Classification Accuracy Classification Accuracy
CIFAR10 90.08% 90.18%
GTSRB 96.48% 95.56%
Figure 6: Robustness of Februus on clean inputs. The first column: Original
inputs. The 2nd column: The visual explanation heatmap based on the logit score
from the classifier. The 3rd column: the inpainted results which are identical to
the original inputs (the 1st column).
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8 Summary
The Februus framework has constructively turned the strength of the input-
agnostic trojan attacks into a weakness. This allows us to both detect the tro-
jan via side-channel in feature maps and cleanse the trojan effects out of ma-
licious inputs on run-time without pre-knowledge of the poisoned networks as
well as the trojan triggers. Extensive experiments on various datasets rang-
ing from CIFAR10 and GTSSRB has shown the robustness of our method to
defense backdoor attacks on different classification tasks. Overall, unlike the
prior works relied on costly labeled data that either stop at anomaly detec-
tion or fine-tune the trojaned networks, Februus is the first single framework
working on cheaply unlabeled data that is capable of cleaning out the tro-
janed triggers from malicious inputs and patching the performance of the
poisoned DNN without the adversarial training. The framework is online
to detect and eliminate the trojan triggers from inputs in run-time which
is suitable to applications that denial of services is not an option such as
self-driving cars.
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